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In 1998 a long-lost proposal for an election law by Gottlob Frege (1848–
1925) was rediscovered in the Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek
in Jena, Germany. Frege’s method for the election of representatives of a
constituency features a remarkable concern for the representation of minori-
ties. Its core idea is that votes cast for unelected candidates are carried over
to the next election, while the elected candidates incur a cost of winning.
We prove that this sensitivity to past elections guarantees a proportional
representation of political opinions over time. We find that through a slight
modification of the original voting method even stronger forms of proportion-
ality can be achieved. This modified version of Frege’s method can also be
seen as providing a novel solution to the apportionment problem. We prove
that it is distinct from all of the best-known apportionment methods, while
it still possesses noteworthy proportionality properties.
1. Introduction
In the summer of 1998 a surprising discovery was made in the Thüringer Universitäts- und
Landesbibliothek (ThULB) in Jena. Hidden among the legacy of the German politician
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Clemens von Delbrück (1856-1921), Uwe Dathe, curator at ThULB, found a typescript
titled Vorschläge für ein Wahlgesetz, which translates to ‘Proposals for a Voting Law’.
The author of the typescript turned out to be no one less than Gottlob Frege (1848–
1925), the illustrious logician and recipient of the letter in which Bertrand Russell ex-
pounds his famous paradox. Although the typescript is undated, circumstantial evidence
points to 1918 as the almost certain year of composition. The manuscript was finally
published in the original German in the year 2000 (Gabriel and Dathe, 2000), accom-
panied by an extensive and excellent introduction by Dathe and Kienzler (2000). The
original typescript has been made digitally available by the Thüringer Universitäts- und
Landesbibliothek in Jena (Frege, 1918).
The discovery of Frege’s proposal was surprising and remarkable. Regarding it merely
as a historical curiosity, however, would not do justice to its originality and perspective.
Rather, we feel that some of its underlying ideas shed a fresh light on modern discussions
on how to elect representatives to political assemblies. In particular, Frege takes a highly
original temporal point of view, where the votes cast for unelected candidates in an
election are carried over to the next election. He furthermore proposes a rudimentary
system of how votes can be delegated from candidate to candidate. In this paper, we
conduct a mathematical analysis of Frege’s proposal and can prove that, even from the
standpoint of modern social choice and apportionment theory, it fares remarkably well.
In the following, we present Frege’s proposal in detail and outline our findings.
1.1. Structure and content of Frege’s proposal
Frege’s typescript consists of four main parts and, in its original form, is presented
on 24 numbered printed pages and is appended by two fold-out tables, Tafel I and
Tafel II. In the following, the page numbering refers to Frege’s proposal as published in
the year 2000 (Frege, 2000), whereas the bracketed numbers refer to the sheets of the
original typescript from 1918 (Frege, 1918).
In a preliminary note (Vorbemerkung) (page 297, [1]–[3]), Frege sketches the general
constitutional provisions of his proposal. He presumes a division of the electorate in
constituencies, with the voters in each constituency delegating an elected representative
to an electoral body like the German Reichstag (page 297, [1]). This is very much in
line with constitutional law in Imperial Germany (1871–1918), where the representatives
of the constituencies were elected by absolute majority and where, in case none of the
candidates succeeded in securing an absolute majority, a run-off took place between the
two candidates with the highest number of votes.1 In this part, he moreover specifies
1The succeeding Weimar Republic (1918–1933) adopted a voting system based on proportional repre-
2
restrictions on active and passive suffrage as he considered them appropriate.
The most original aspects of Frege’s election law are to be found in the second part
(pages 297–299, [2]–[4]) of the manuscript. In eleven articles numbered §5 through §15,
Frege presents the voting method by means of which the representative of a constituency
is chosen.
Finally, Frege makes a short concluding remark (Schlussbemerkung, page 299, [4]–
[5]) concerning the use of referenda to settle political disputes, which is followed by an
extensive discussion elucidating the various aspects of his voting law (Erläuterungen,
pages 299–311, [5]–[24]). The two tables appended by Frege illustrate his voting method
by means of two examples he constructed for the purpose (pages 312–313).
1.2. Political views underlying Frege’s proposal
Frege’s proposal for a voting law displays a remarkable juxtaposition of highly conser-
vative and nationalistic views with classical liberal ideals. Frege’s conservative views
are most clearly manifested in his proposal to restrict the right to vote to married men
without criminal convictions (“unbescholten”), who have performed military service, and
who received no state support (“Almosen”) in the previous year (197, [1]–[2]). He explic-
itly declined women’s suffrage on grounds that the husband be the head of the family,
the alleged political unit of German society as he saw it (311, [23]–[24]). To put this
into perspective, it should be noted that women’s suffrage was made law on November
30 of the same year that Frege presumably wrote his proposal, with the first German
women casting their votes for the Wahl zur Deutschen Nationalversammlung on January
19, 1919.
The deep conservatism inherent in these considerations2 is in quite some contrast with
the more liberal ideals underlying his voting method. According to Frege himself, the
voting method constitutes the fundamental thought of his voting law and can largely be
considered independently of his ideas about suffrage (197, [1]). In this paper, we will
concentrate on the mathematical aspects of Frege’s voting method, and leave the other
parts of his proposal largely uncommented.
Frege’s voting method is based on the classical liberal notion that the voters in a con-
stituency should be represented by an elected representative in a national assembly or
parliament while upholding the ideal of one-man-one-vote. Frege’s main concern is to
sentation, where multiple representatives were elected in each of a smaller number of constituencies
of a considerably larger size than was usual in Imperial Germany.
2Later in his life, Frege’s conservatism and nationalism would give way to more extreme views on the
political far right, in particular a strong antisemitic position, as witnessed by his diary entries from
1924 (Gabriel and Kienzler, 1994; Mendelsohn, 1996).
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guarantee that no voters’ votes are lost in the election process (197, [1]; 308–9, [19]–[20])
by ensuring that even political minorities should send the constituency’s representative
from their midst at some point in time. Failing to do so is a problem that is notori-
ously inherent in electoral systems where representatives are elected in single-member
constituencies by majoritarian or first-past-the-post methods, that is, systems where the
voters indicate a single candidate on their ballot, and the candidate occurring on most
ballots is elected as representative of the constituency. Arguably, any vote cast on a
minority candidate serves the voter, and the candidate, just as well as had the voter
not participated in the election, and can consequently be considered lost (Erläuterungen,
303, [10]).
1.3. Frege’s core idea: Elections as process over time
Frege’s solution to the problem of votes for non-winning candidates being lost during
elections is to acknowledge the fact that elections take place repeatedly over time. He
sees the election of representatives not so much as a one-shot event, but rather as a
series of connected and interdependent events proceeding in rounds. In his proposal,
elections are held every five years (§6, 298, [2]), where voters submit a (plurality) ballot,
indicating a single candidate, just as it was law in Germany between 1871 and 1918. He
proposes, however, that the representative of a constituency should not be elected on
the basis of the votes received in the current election alone, but also on those cast in
previous elections. More precisely, every candidate has a voting score (“Stimmenzahl”),
which, after initially being set to zero (§5,§7, 297–8, [2]), is increased by the number
of votes received in each election. Frege makes a crucial proviso for the incumbent
representative of the constituency: on the Friday before the election, the incumbent’s
voting score is decreased by the integer part of the average voting score of all candidates
(§14, 299, [4]). The votes thus subtracted, Frege argues, have served their purpose and
cannot be considered lost (Vorbemerkung, 197, [2]). We suggest that they can be viewed
as the cost of winning that the elected representative incurs. The candidate with the
highest voting score after the election is then elected as representative for the next five
years. Possible ties are broken on the basis of age and, in case of an equal number of
days lived, by lot (§13, 299, [4]).
With Frege’s voting method, candidates that only attract minor support among the
electorate keep accumulating votes over time, and at some point will be elected as rep-
resentative. Thus, also minority opinions are guaranteed to be represented in elected
political assemblies, which complies with Frege’s guiding principle that no votes should
be lost. Should his voting law be adopted, Frege anticipates the lively participation of
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all voters in the elections (Erläuterungen, 303–4, [11]), a concern that has also attracted
attention in social choice theory (Fishburn and Brams, 1983; Moulin, 1988).
To the same end, Frege arranges for the installation of a maximum of twenty-five choice
candidates (“Erlesene”) as those candidates in a constituency with maximal voting score
(§8, 298, [2]). The representative is chosen among these choice candidates and non-choice
candidates need to transfer their votes to one of the choice candidates. This is to ensure
that the votes cast on non-choice candidates are not lost or too much scattered to be of
any effect. Frege claims that the number of twenty-five choice candidates should suffice
for all non-choice candidates to find a politically like-minded choice candidate to transfer
their votes to (Erläuterungen, 303, [10]). Frege also provisions for the transfer of votes
from a choice candidate to a deputy should the former die or otherwise lose his status
as a choice candidate (§11, 298, [3]). In what follows, however, we will not make this
distinction between choice and non-choice candidates.
Given the objectives of Frege’s voting method, a key issue is how often a candidate can
be expected to be elected as representative given his support in the constituency. Even
though Frege does not seem to pursue proportional representation (“Proportionswahl”) as
a political aim in itself he states without formal proof that: “If the strengths of political
directions in a constituency remain the same over a prolonged period of time, then the
number of times during which each of these directions is represented by the representative
of the constituency will behave approximately proportionally to these strengths” (Frege,
2000, 302, [8]).3 The main goal of our paper is to investigate in a mathematically rigorous
manner whether Frege’s claim can be vindicated.
1.4. Contributions of this paper
Frege’s intended audience presumably being politicians rather than academics, Frege
neither provided a formal definition nor a formal analysis of his voting method.
We aim to fill this gap and, in Section 2, start by formulating his proposal in the precise
mathematical framework of modern social choice theory. We first observe that Frege’s
method fails to be proportional in the strict sense even under the assumption that the
voters’ number and preferences remain constant over time: examples are easily found in
which at some point a candidate is elected more often (and another less often) than would
be justified by the number of votes he received as a proportion of the total of votes cast
(Example 2). We show, however, that this failure of proportionality can be attributed to
3The original German reads: “Wenn die Richtungen in einem Wahlkreise längere Zeit hindurch dieselben
Stärken behalten, werden sich die Zeiten, während deren die einzelnen durch den Abgeordneten des
Wahlkreises vertreten werden, annähernd wie diese Stärken verhalten”. Translation by the authors.
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the particularity of Frege’s method that the cost of being chosen representative varies over
time. Even more, the variation of this cost creates a massive, disproportional advantage
for strong candidates who pay a lower cost than minority candidates.
In Section 3, we can nevertheless prove that the cost of winning will converge and
stabilize at the number of voters after a finite number of elections–provided that the size
of the constituency remains constant (Lemma 1). Frege appears to have been aware of
this phenomenon, as he now and then speaks of a stable state (“Dauerzustand”) in this
context (302, [8]). This convergence of the cost of winning can take a very long time, as is
also indicated by the two examples Frege himself constructed to illustrate his procedure
(Erläuterungen, 300–1, [5]–[7]; Tafel I and Tafel II ). In both of the examples, the cost
of winning can be shown to stabilize only after 184 elections. As Frege proposes that
elections are held every five years, this process will take 920 years.
As soon as the cost of winning has stabilized, however, the behaviour of Frege’s voting
method becomes more favorable. We can show that, as time proceeds, the proportion
of times a candidate is chosen will converge towards the proportion of the candidate’s
support in the electorate. In other words, Frege’s method achieves proportionality in
the limit (Theorem 1). Again, this result requires that the size of the electorate remains
constant and that the average number of votes each candidate receives converges. In this
context, it is interesting that Frege explicitly expresses the desirability of constituencies
being of about equal size and their composition changing as little as possible (Vorbe-
merkung, 197, [1]). If instead the size of the electorate is not assumed to be constant but
can grow over time, we give an example showing that this convergence to proportionality
does no longer hold (Example 3).
The problems that come with the long initialisation phase before the cost of win-
ning stabilizes suggest a modified version of Frege’s voting method which we present
in Section 4. For this modified version, the number of votes cast for each candidate is
normalized to lie between 0 and 1, and the cost of winning is invariably 1. The latter
stipulation intuitively corresponds to the cost of winning being equal to the number of
voters. The modified version of Frege’s voting method is well-behaved immediately and
has stronger proportionality guarantees over time than Frege’s original method. In par-
ticular, we prove that, at any point in time, the number of times each candidate has
been chosen lies within a bounded margin from his or her proportional share of votes
aggregated up to that time (Theorems 3 and 4).
Frege’s original method was conceived for the election of a single representative in
a constituency and rests on the liberal principle of voting for individual candidates
(“Persönlichkeitswahl”) instead of a party-list system (“Listenwahl”). That is, the method
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should guarantee fair representation of citizens’ opinions in parliament rather than re-
flect the strength of political parties. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to represent
Frege as making a case for proportional representation as such. Nevertheless, the modified
Frege method, as proposed in this paper, can naturally be interpreted as an apportion-
ment method as is commonly used for assigning seats to parties in a political assembly in
systems of proportional representation. This apportionment method, which we introduce
in Section 5 and refer to as the Frege’s apportionment method, assigns to each political
party as many seats as the number of times it would be elected as representative if the
modified Frege method were run for so many times as there are seats in the assembly
(parliament) while keeping the electorate fixed.
We can show that Frege’s apportionment method is not mathematically equivalent to
any of the methods that are common in the literature. In particular, we demonstrate
that it differs from the Adams method, the D’Hondt (or Jefferson) method, the quota
method, the Sainte-Laguë (or Webster) method, the largest remainder method, and
the Huntington-Hill method. Analysing its compliance with the customary axioms for
apportionment, we prove that Frege’s apportionment method satisfies house monotonicity
and upper quota but fails population monotonicity. Lower quota is only satisfied if the
number of candidates is at most three (Theorem 5). As an apportionment method, it
therefore behaves surprisingly well, especially given the fact that it was not designed
as one. Only the quota method by Balinski and Young (1975) satisfies all of the axioms
mentioned above that are also satisfied by Frege’s method. The quota method, however, is
notoriously biased against small parties. Frege’s method fares considerably better in this
respect, as suggested by a numerical experiment in which we compare the number of votes
per representative of the largest party and the number of votes per representative of the
smallest party (Section 5.3). The conclusion seems to be fair that Frege’s apportionment
method is an interesting and novel addition to the apportionment literature.
Further discussions of Frege’s proposals follow at the end of the paper in Section 6.
So as not to interrupt the flow of the argument, mathematical proofs are deferred to
the appendix. An open-source Python implementation of Frege’s voting rule and our
modified version is available (Harrenstein et al., 2020).
1.5. Related work
Frege’s voting method is difficult to compare with other voting rules due to its temporal
nature, a feature that voting rules typically do not possess. Thus, we only briefly review
some works in social choice theory that combine voting and a temporal structure. For-
malisms such as iterative voting (Meir, 2017) and dynamic social choice (Tennenholtz,
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2004; Boutilier and Procaccia, 2012; Parkes and Procaccia, 2013) consider voting scenar-
ios with changing (dynamic) preferences. In contrast to Frege’s proposal, these essentially
concern a single election where preferences are updated over time. In particular, they
are not concerned with proportional outcomes over time.
Another line of work (Conitzer et al., 2017; Freeman et al., 2017; Lackner, 2020) is
concerned with repeating elections, similar to Frege’s proposal. These works, however,
focus on fairness towards voters and discuss mechanisms that guarantee a fair distribution
of utility among voters over time. From this point of view, these works can be viewed as
an orthogonal approach to the one of Frege, where all emphasis is put on fairness towards
candidates and individual voters are not taken into account. We return in Section 6 to
this partial disregard of voters’ current preferences.
Finally, the storable votes method (Casella, 2005, 2012) is a voting rule based on
plurality voting. In each election, voters can decide to either cast a vote or to transfer
their vote weight to future elections. If a voter decides to cast a vote, she can spend all,
some, or none of her stored weight from previous elections. This rule vaguely resembles
Frege’ proposal as it allows minority candidates to win at some point, however only if
they have supporters that strategically act to their benefit. This kind of strategic voting
is not required with Frege’s proposal; Frege even made his proposal with the intention of
reducing strategic voting.
2. Mathematical Formulation of Frege’s Voting Method
Frege couched his voting law in legal terms, and also his subsequent discussions are math-
ematically informal. In this section we provide a mathematical formulation of Frege’s
voting law, where we concentrate on the voting mechanism Frege proposed. In particular
we focus on the way candidates accumulate votes over the course of multiple elections and
whether this leads to a fair (proportional) representation of opinions over time. We will
make the simplifying assumption that candidates remain the same over time, but we do
allow voters to change their number, their identity, and opinion as to their most preferred
candidate, unless stated otherwise. In particular, we will disregard Frege’s distinction
between choice candidates (“Erlesene”) and non-choice candidates, and the delegation
mechanism it enables. Thus, in our analysis, every candidate accumulates votes.
Let C be a set of m ≥ 2 candidates. Voting proceeds in rounds over time, meaning
that at every point in time t ≥ 1 an election takes place and a new representative repr (t)
is chosen. We have nt denote the number of voters participating in the election at time t.
In every election, the voters submit their preferences by means of plurality ballots, that is,
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for every t ≥ 1, the voters specify their most preferred candidate only. We denote by πtj
the plurality score of candidate j at time t, that is, the number of voters that put j on
their ballot at time t. Since every and only participating voters cast votes on candidates,
we thus have nt =
∑
j∈C π
t
j . We speak of a fixed electorate if the number of voters and
the candidates’ plurality scores remain constant over time, that is, if nt = n and π
t
j = πj
for all t ≥ 1 and j ∈ C.
In each round t of the election process, an aggregate score σtj is calculated for every
candidate j on the basis of the scores obtained at the time of the election (πtj) and the
scores obtained in past elections. The candidate which obtains the maximal aggregate
score at time t is chosen as representative for round t, that is, repr (t) = argmaxj∈C σ
t
j . In
case of a tie, the candidate that is lexicographically first is chosen. This is equivalent to
assuming a fixed tie-breaking order, for instance, by breaking ties in favour of the oldest
candidate, as suggested by Frege himself. Formally, we define the aggregate score σtj of a
candidate j at time t inductively such that, for every t ≥ 1,
σ1j = π
1
j
σt+1j =


σtj + π
t+1
j −
⌊
1
m
·
∑
k∈C σ
t
k
⌋
if repr (t) = j,
σtj + π
t+1
j otherwise.
The term
⌊
1
m
·
∑
k∈C σ
t
k
⌋
can be seen as the cost of winning the election at time t, as
it is later subtracted from the aggregate score of the winning candidate. Note that this
number is chosen in such a way that the aggregate scores of all candidates are guaranteed
to remain non-negative at all times. Furthermore, observe that the aggregate scores at
time t are used to elect the representative at time t and consequently only include the
costs of winning of previous rounds and not of time t.
Example 1. Consider a fixed electorate with three candidates and ten voters, and let
the corresponding plurality scores of candidates a, b, and c be 5, 3, and 2, respectively.
Table 1 depicts the values of σtj for t = 1, . . . , 10. Maximum aggregate scores of each
round are printed in bold. At time 1, candidate a is chosen, because a has a maximum
aggregate score of 5. At time 2, each candidate keeps the votes he had obtained at time 1
plus the votes obtained at time 2, which we assumed to be the same as at time 1. Thus
for candidates b and c the aggregate scores at time 2 are 3 + 3 = 6 and 2 + 2 = 4,
respectively. The cost of winning incurred by candidate a at time 1 amounts to 3 =
⌊10/3⌋, which has to be subtracted from the number of votes candidate a received at time 1
and time 2. Accordingly, candidate a’s aggregate score σ2a at time 2 is calculated as
9
time t σta σ
t
b σ
t
c repr (t)
⌊
1
3 ·
∑
k∈C σ
t
k
⌋
1 5 3 2 a 3
2 7 6 4 a 5
3 7 9 6 b 7
4 12 5 8 a 8
5 9 8 10 c 9
6 14 11 3 a 9
7 10 14 5 b 9
8 15 8 7 a 10
9 10 11 9 b 10
10 15 4 11 a 10
Table 1: A simple example of Frege’s method (Example 1). Maximum aggregate scores
are printed in bold.
5 + 5 − 3 = 7. Hence, at time 2, candidate a again has the highest aggregate score
and is elected representative another time. The cost of winning at time 2, however, has
increased to 5, and at time 3, it is candidate b who has the maximum aggregate score
and is elected representative, this time at a cost of 7. And so on. Note that the cost of
winning increases over time, starting with 3 and increasing to 10, the number of voters.
Once the cost of winning has reached 10—indicated in the table by the dashed line—it
stabilizes and remains constant at all subsequent time steps.
The increasing cost
⌊
1
m
·
∑
k∈C σ
t
k
⌋
of winning, as we saw in Example 1, suggests an
unfairness inherent in Frege’s voting method. Early winners, that is, those candidates
with the highest plurality scores, incur lower costs for being elected than those candidates
that win later. This makes it advantageous to win early in the election process, creating
a positive bias towards strong candidates and accordingly constitutes a disadvantage
for minority candidates. This is also reflected in these candidates being elected more
often than would seem to be justified by the proportion of the electorate that supports
them. This phenomenon is all the more remarkable as it was Frege’s intention to also
strengthen minority opinions (Frege 2000, Erläuterungen, 306, [15]; Gabriel and Dathe
2000, page 292). How extreme this distortion can be is illustrated by the following
example.
Example 2. Let us consider a scenario that highlights the unfairness introduced by in-
creasing costs (Table 2). We have a fixed electorate with 6 candidates and 10 voters.
The corresponding plurality scores πj of the candidates a through f are 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, and 5,
10
time a b c d e f representative
⌊
1
6 ·
∑
k∈C σ
t
k
⌋
1 1 1 1 1 1 5 f 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 9 f 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 11 f 4
4 4 4 4 4 4 12 f 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 12 f 6
6 6 6 6 6 6 11 f 6
7 7 7 7 7 7 10 f 7
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 a 8
9 1 9 9 9 9 13 f 8
10 2 10 10 10 10 10 b 8
Table 2: The unfairness of increasing costs: candidate f wins unproportionally often
(Example 2)
respectively. The table below depicts the values of σtj for t = 1, . . . , 10 and j ∈ C. Ties
occur in rows with more than one element printed in bold. We assume that ties are bro-
ken in alphabetical order and thus always to the disadvantage of f . After ten rounds,
candidate f has been chosen eight times, candidates a and b have been chosen once, and
candidates c, d and e not at all. This shows that Frege’s voting method does not select
representatives in a proportional fashion: in ten rounds it would be possible to perfectly
reflect the distribution of votes, that is, by choosing candidate f five times and all other
candidates once.
At this point, we would like to make a minor remark concerning Frege’s use of the
floor function in the definition of the cost of winning as
⌊
1
m
·
∑
k∈C σ
t
k
⌋
in his voting
method (cf. σt+1j , as defined above).
4 This was most likely motivated by considerations
of numerical simplicity, but, for our purposes, does not have a significant mathematical
effect. Replacing the term
⌊
1
m
·
∑
k∈C σ
t
k
⌋
with 1
m
·
∑
k∈C σ
t
k does not help to resolve any
of the issues identified in Example 2.
In Example 1, we also saw that after time 7, the cost of winning stabilizes at 10. After
this time, therefore, candidates no longer gain an advantage by being elected earlier
rather than later, at least not with respect to the cost of winning. This phenomenon
is not specific to Example 1; also in Example 2 the cost of winning will stabilize at
time 17, when it reaches a cost of 10. Rather, as long as the size of the electorate
4Frege writes: “A remainder that is smaller than the number of choice candidates of a constituency, is
left disregarded” (“Ein Rest, der kleiner als die Anzahl der Erlesenen des Wahlkreises ist, bleibt dabei
unberücksichtigt”) (§14, 299, [4], English translation by the authors).
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remains constant, the convergence of the cost of winning to the number of voters will
hold generally (Lemma 1, below). Under further conditions on how the opinions in
the electorate evolve over time, moreover, the unfairness caused by the varying costs of
winning in the initial phase will taper off and result in a proportional representation in
the long run. We formally prove this in the next section.
The unfairness towards minority candidates caused by the increasing costs of winning
suggests a variation of Frege’s method where the cost of winning is stipulated to be
constant from the outset. We introduce the modified Frege method in Section 4 and
show that it not only guarantees proportionality in the long run, but also has stronger
proportionality properties, which we will make formally precise.
3. Proportionality Guarantees for Frege’s Method
In the previous section we saw how the cost of winning converges as long as the number
of voters is fixed. We now make this observation mathematically precise. The proof of
this lemma as well as all further proofs can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 1. Assume that the number of voters is fixed, i.e., nt = n for all t ≥ 1. Then the
function a(t) =
∑
k∈C σ
t
k is monotonically increasing. Moreover, there exists a positive
number t0 such that a(t) = n ·m for all t ≥ t0.
This convergence process of the cost of winning (which is ⌊a(t)/m⌋) to the number of
voters can take quite a long time: In Frege’s proposal, he provided two explanatory
examples with n = 1000 and m = 25. With these parameters, Frege’s voting method
reaches a constant cost of winning at time t0 = 184. As Frege proposes that elections
are held every five years, this would amount to 920 years.
Let us continue by specifying in which sense Frege’s voting method violates even a
most basic form of proportionality, as noted in Example 2. In what follows, let ρj(t)
denote the number of times candidate j is chosen as representative up until time t, that
is, ρj(t) = | {s ≤ t : repr (s) = j} |. Under the assumption of a fixed electorate, after t
rounds, each candidate j should ideally win t ·
pij
n
times, that is, the number of rounds
multiplied by the proportion of the electorate that supports candidate j. If t ·
pij
n
is an
integer for all j, a perfectly proportional outcome is possible. This observation gives rise
to the following definition.
Definition 1. A fixed electorate with plurality scores (πj)j∈C has integral quotas at
time t if t ·
pij
n
is integral for all candidates j. We say that an (infinite) sequence of
12
chosen representatives (repr (1), repr (2), . . . ) satisfies variable integral quota if for any
time t ≥ 1 at which the electorate has integral quotas, it holds that
ρj(t) = t ·
πj
n
for every j ∈ C.
Example 2 shows that Frege’s method cannot guarantee this property: a sequence of
representatives chosen by Frege’s method may violate variable integral quota. Note that
variable integral quota applies to rather few electorates, namely only fixed electorates
considered at time points when a perfectly proportional outcomes is possible. Hence,
we consider variable integral quota as a weak and very basic form of proportionality.
However, the following theorem shows under which conditions ρj(t)/t will converge to
pij/n. Thus, Frege’s method provides a form of proportionality in the long run.
Theorem 1. If we assume a fixed electorate, i.e., nt = n and π
t
j = πj for all t ≥ 1, the
following holds for Frege’s voting method:
lim
t→∞
ρj(t)
t
=
πj
n
.
If nt = n and for all t ≥ 1 and for all j ∈ C there is some π
∗
j ∈ [0, 1] such that
lim
t→∞
∑t
s=1 π
s
j
t
= π∗j ,
then the following holds for all candidates j ∈ C:
lim
t→∞
ρj(t)
t
=
π∗j
n
.
The following proposition shows that, for a fixed electorate, proportionality is not only
guaranteed in the limit but eventually also within (finite) intervals.
Proposition 1. If we assume a fixed electorate with n voters, there exists a time t∗ ≥ 1
and a period length P ∈ N such that, for all t ≥ t∗ and all j ∈ C,
ρj(t+ P )− ρj(t)
P
=
πj
n
.
If we do not assume a fixed number of voters, proportionality cannot be guaranteed
even as t→∞. To see this, consider the following example.
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Example 3. We consider a scenario with two candidates, a and b. For t = 1, there are
three voters and π1a = 2, π
1
b = 1. In every following round the number of voters is doubled
and the ratio pita/pit
b
remains the same, namely 2. We thus have πta = 2
t and πtb = 2
t−1.
As we will see, candidate b never wins despite receiving one third of the votes.
In order to see this, let us prove that σta > σ
t
b for all t ≥ 1 by induction over t. The
basis is clearly fulfilled since σ1a = π
1
a = 2 > 1 = π
1
b = σ
1
b . For the induction step, we
assume that σsa > σ
s
b for all s ≤ t, that is, candidate a has always won so far. We thus
have:
σt+1a = σ
t
a + 2
t+1 −
⌊
σta + σ
t
b
2
⌋
and σt+1b = σ
t
b + 2
t.
Since σta > σ
t
b, it follows: ⌊
σta + σ
t
b
2
⌋
≤
σta + σ
t
b
2
< σta.
Moreover, since b has not been chosen so far,
σt+1b =
t+1∑
s=1
πsb =
t+1∑
s=1
2s−1 = 2t+1 − 1.
We thus have:
σt+1a = σ
t
a + 2
t+1 −
⌊
σta + σ
t
b
2
⌋
> σta + 2
t+1 − σta = 2
t+1 > σt+1b .
Thus, candidate b will never be chosen as representative.
In conclusion, Frege’s method is not proportional for arbitrary time intervals, but
converges to proportional outcomes if the size of the electorate is fixed.
4. The Modified Frege Method
The examples in Section 2 and the results of Section 3 point to an increasing cost of win-
ning as the reason for Frege’s original method failing a reasonable form of proportionality
in the initial phase before the cost of winning has stabilized. This observation suggests
that a natural variation of Frege’s original method, for which the cost of winning is stip-
ulated to be constant, might do better. We thus introduce the following modification
of Frege’s method, which we will refer to as the modified Frege method. In the formal
definition of the modified Frege method, we abstract from the size of the electorate and
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accordingly use normalized plurality scores ptj for candidates j and times t ≥ 1:
ptj =
πtj
nt
,
where nt denotes the total number of voters at time t. The aggregate scores for the
modified Frege method are defined as follows, where we use Latin letters to denote
variables instead of Greek ones as in the definition of Frege’s original method:
s1j = p
1
j
st+1j =


stj + p
t+1
j − 1 if repr (t) = j,
stj + p
t+1
j otherwise.
One may wonder why the number 1 is subtracted from the winning candidate. The
reason is that this choice ensures that the sum
∑
j∈C s
t
j of aggregated scores is invariably 1
for all times t. Hence, this stipulation intuitively corresponds to the cost of winning being
equal to the number of voters, as it is eventually the case for Frege’s original method
(cf. Lemma 1). A potential disadvantage of the modified Frege method is that aggregated
scores can become negative; we will further discuss this issue at the end of the paper in
Section 6.
Example 4. Let us now reconsider Example 2 for the modified Frege method, as depicted
in the table below. The normalized plurality scores for candidates a through f are 0.1,
0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, and 0.5, respectively.
time a b c d e f representative
1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 f
2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 a
3 −0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 f
4 −0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 b
5 −0.5 −0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 c
6 −0.4 −0.4 −0.4 0.6 0.6 1.0 f
7 −0.3 −0.3 −0.3 0.7 0.7 0.5 d
8 −0.2 −0.2 −0.2 −0.2 0.8 1.0 f
9 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1 0.9 0.5 e
10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 f
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We now see that this method produces a proportional outcome: candidate f wins five
times and all other candidates once, which is exactly in accordance with the candidates’
proportional share of the votes.
The modified Frege method enjoys a number of proportionality properties that are
stronger than the ones that can be proven for Frege’s original method. In the following, let
rj(t) denote the number of times candidate j is chosen as representative up to time t, that
is rj(t) = | {s ≤ t : repr (s) = j} |. First, we show that a similar statement to Theorem 1
holds for the modified Frege method:
Theorem 2. If we assume that ptj = pj for all t ≥ 1, the following holds for the modified
Frege method:
lim
t→∞
rj(t)
t
= pj.
If the normalized plurality scores ptj are not fixed but for all j ∈ C there is some p
∗
j ∈ [0, 1]
such that
lim
t→∞
∑t
s=1 p
s
j
t
= p∗j ,
then the following holds for all candidates j ∈ C:
lim
t→∞
rj(t)
t
= lim
t→∞
∑t
s=1 p
s
j
t
= p∗j .
Theorem 2 provides a proportionality guarantee for the modified Frege method in
the long run. Note that Theorem 2 does not require the number of voters to be fixed,
in contrast to the analogous result for Frege’s original method where this assumption is
necessary (cf. Theorem 1 and Example 3). We will now aim for much stronger guarantees,
namely guarantees that hold for arbitrary time intervals. We strengthen the definition
of variable integral quota (Definition 1) to hold for arbitrary electorates, inspired by the
lower and upper quota axioms in the apportionment setting (cf. Section 5).
Definition 2. For all candidates j ∈ C, let p1j , p
2
j , . . . be an infinite sequence of nor-
malized plurality scores. We say that an (infinite) sequence of chosen representatives
repr (1), repr (2), . . . satisfies variable upper quota if for any time t ≥ 1 it holds that
rj(t) ≤
⌈
t∑
s=1
psj
⌉
for every j ∈ C,
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and it satisfies variable lower quota if for any time t ≥ 1 it holds that
rj(t) ≥
⌊
t∑
s=1
psj
⌋
for every j ∈ C.
Note that both variable upper and lower quota imply variable integral quota: in case of
integral quotas any deviation from a proportional distribution would also violate variable
upper and lower quota. In the following we say that the modified Frege method satisfies
variable lower or upper quota if any sequence of winners produced by this method satisfies
the corresponding axiom.
Theorem 3. The modified Frege method satisfies variable upper quota.
As a consequence, the modified Frege method also satisfies variable integral quota. By
contrast, it violates variable lower quota, as the following example illustrates.
Example 5. Let us consider a fixed electorate with six candidates and 2750 voters. The
plurality scores are 1001, 1000, 206, 182, 181, and 180, respectively; the corresponding
normalized plurality scores are obtained by dividing these numbers by 2750. For increased
readability, the aggregate scores stj are multiplied by 2750 in the table below.
time a b c d e f representative
1 1001 1000 206 182 181 180 a
2 −748 2000 412 364 362 360 b
3 253 250 618 546 543 540 c
4 1254 1250 −1926 728 724 720 a
5 −495 2250 −1720 910 905 900 b
6 506 500 −1514 1092 1086 1080 d
7 1507 1500 −1308 −1476 1267 1260 a
8 −242 2500 −1102 −1294 1448 1440 b
9 759 750 −896 −1112 1629 1620 e
10 1760 1750 −690 −930 −940 1800 f
11 2761 2750 −484 −748 −759 −770 a
The variable lower and upper quota of candidate b at round 11 is 11·10002750 = 4, but
candidate b has been chosen only 3 times, that is, rb(11) = 3. Similar examples can be
found for m = 4 (for instance, with plurality scores of 1001, 1000, 115, and 26, and for
t = 30) and m = 5 (for instance, with plurality scores of 1001, 1000, 300, 107, and 92 and
for t = 15).
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We can nevertheless show that the violations of variable lower quota by the modified
Frege method are not too severe. This is in particular the case for electorates with few
candidates, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 4. For m ∈ {2, 3}, the modified Frege method satisfies variable lower quota.
For m ≥ 4, we have rj(t) ≥
⌊∑t
s=1 p
s
j
⌋
−
⌈
m−3
2
⌉
for every candidate j and time t ≥ 1.
The following example shows, however, that variable lower quota violations can still
be arbitrarily large. Yet, this construction requires a number of candidates that is ex-
ponential in the size of the violation. Thus it may still be possible to strengthen the
bounds of Theorem 4 for the cases in which m ≥ 6. (Example 5 shows that Theorem 4
is optimal for m = 4 and m = 5.)
Example 6. We define a variable electorate with candidates C = {1, . . . ,m} and nt =
m− t+ 1 voters for t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. At time t, we have plurality scores of
πtj = 0 for j ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1},
πtj = 1 for j ∈ {t, . . . ,m}.
The corresponding normalized plurality scores are
ptj = 0 for j ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1},
ptj =
1
m− t+ 1
for j ∈ {t, . . . ,m}.
Furthermore, we assume that if candidate i and j are tied, then the tie is broken in
favor of min(i, j). Due to this tie-breaking assumption, the modified Frege method selects
candidate 1 in the first round, candidate 2 in the second, candidate t in round t. Let
us consider round m − 1, in which candidate m − 1 wins. The variable lower quota of
candidate m is
⌊∑m−1
s=1 p
s
m
⌋
=
⌊
1
m
+ 1
m−1 + · · ·+
1
2
⌋
=
⌊∑m
i=2
1
i
⌋
>
∑m
i=1
1
i
− 2. Since
the harmonic series
∑∞
i=1
1
i
grows without limit, the variable lower quota of candidate m
is unbounded for a growing number of candidates (m). Recall that candidate m has not
won yet after round m−1. Thus, if m tends to infinity, so does the violation of candidate
m’s variable lower quota at time t = m− 1.
5. The Apportionment Setting
In this section, we want to analyse Frege’s methods from the viewpoint of apportionment.
Let us first review the apportionment problem and well-known methods that provide
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apportionment solutions.
5.1. Apportionment methods
An apportionment problem for m parties is given by a vote distribution p = (p1, . . . , pm)
with
∑m
i=1 pi = 1 and a desired house size k. A solution to the apportionment prob-
lem (p, k) is an m-sequence of non-negative integers (a1, . . . , am) with
∑m
i=1 ai = k.
An apportionment method is a function that returns for every apportionment problem
a valid solution5. Apportionment has two main applications: to assign a fixed num-
ber of parliamentary seats to parties (proportionally to their vote count), and to assign
representatives in a senate to states (proportionally to their population count). From a
mathematical point of view, these two applications are indistinguishable, and, in partic-
ular, this distinction is not relevant for our study. For the sake of clarity, we speak in the
following of parties and seats. We are now going to introduce important apportionment
methods (cf. Balinski and Young, 1982; Pukelsheim, 2017).
Largest remainder method. The earliest proposal for an apportionment method is
the largest remainder method (also: Hamilton method). The largest remainder method
assigns in a first step ⌊kpi⌋ seats to each party. In a second step, all remaining seats are
distributed so that each party receives at most one seat. Priority is given to parties with
the largest remainder, i.e., those with largest kpi − ⌊kpi⌋.
Divisor methods. Divisor methods are the most commonly used apportionment meth-
ods. Their definition is based on divisor criteria: A divisor criterion is a monotonically
increasing function d : N → R that satisfies i ≤ d(i) ≤ i + 1 for all i ≥ 0. A divisor
criterion d induces a d-rounding, defined as follows:
[x]d = {a ∈ N : d(a− 1) ≤ x ≤ d(a)} .
If x = d(a) for some a, then [x]d contains two integers, otherwise only one. For example,
the divisor criterion d(a) = a+1 corresponds to rounding down, with the slight difference
that rounding down an integer a yields here both a and a− 1.
Given a divisor criterion d we define a corresponding divisor method: the set of d-
5To simplify the presentation, we assume that ties are broken in some fashion and thus apportionment
methods always return a single solution.
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admissible solutions is defined as{
(a1, . . . , am) ∈ N
m :
m∑
i=1
ai = k and ai ∈
[pi
x
]
d
for some positive x ∈ R
}
.
As we require that apportionment methods return only one solution, a tie-breaking mech-
anism may be necessary to choose one solution in this set.
We can now define the most common divisor methods: The D’Hondt method (or
Jefferson method) is defined by d(a) = a + 1, i.e., rounding down. The Adams method
is defined by d(a) = a (rounding up). The Sainte-Laguë method (or Webster method) is
defined by d(a) = a+0.5, which corresponds to rounding to the nearest integer. Finally,
the Huntington-Hill method uses the d(a) =
√
a(a+ 1) criterion.
Quota method. The quota method (Balinski and Young, 1975) is the most recent ad-
dition to this list of apportionment methods. It is defined iteratively, starting with
the empty solution (0, . . . , 0). In round ℓ ≥ 1, if (a1, . . . , am) is the current solution
(
∑
ai = ℓ − 1), we consider all parties that would not violate upper quota (cf. Defi-
nition 4) if they received an additional seat, i.e., all parties i with ai + 1 ≤ ⌈piℓ⌉ or,
equivalently, ai < piℓ. Then we choose among these parties the one party i with maxi-
mum pi/(ai + 1) (subject to a tie-breaking, if necessary); party i receives another seat.
Frege’s apportionment method. Both Frege’s original method and the modified Frege
method can easily be transformed into apportionment methods. However, since Frege’s
original method violates even a very basic proportionality property (weak proportionality,
see below), it is not a sensible method in this context and we omit it here from further
study. To apply the modified Frege method, we view the vote distribution (p1, . . . , pm) as
a fixed electorate and apply the method for k rounds, thus obtaining an apportionment
solution (r1(k), . . . , rm(k)). Let us refer to this method as Frege’s apportionment method.
Given this interpretation, it is natural to ask how Frege’s apportionment method com-
pares to other apportionment methods, and, in particular, whether it is equivalent to an
already established method in the apportionment setting. We answer these questions in
the following section.
5.2. Apportionment axioms
For an overview of apportionment methods and their respective properties, we refer
the reader to Table 3; the corresponding analysis can be found, e.g., in the book by
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house
monot.
popul.
monot.
lower
quota
upper
quota
quota for
m = 3
Largest Remainder − − + + +
D’Hondt (Jefferson) + + + − −
Adams + + − + −
Sainte-Laguë (Webster) + + − − +
Huntington-Hill + + − − −
Quota method + − + + +
Frege’s apportionment method + − − + +
Table 3: An overview of apportionment methods and their respective properties.
Balinski and Young (1982). In the following, we discuss axiomatic properties of Frege’s
apportionment method. The column “bias” is discussed in Section 5.3.
As a first step, we want to discuss a basic requirement of apportionment methods,
called weak proportionality.
Definition 3. An apportionment method satisfies weak proportionality if, given an ap-
portionment problem ((p1, . . . , pm), k) with k · pi being integer for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
the method returns (kp1, . . . , kpm).
It is easy to see that our concept of variable integral quota is closely related to weak
proportionality. Thus, Frege’s original method, seen as an apportionment method, vio-
lates this property. This is the reason why we focus on Frege’s apportionment method
(which is based on the modified Frege method). Let us now consider two stronger pro-
portionality requirements:
Definition 4. An apportionment method satisfies upper quota if, for any apportionment
problem ((p1, . . . , pm), k), the method returns a solution (a1, . . . , am) satisfying ai ≤ ⌈kpi⌉
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. An apportionment method satisfies lower quota if, for any appor-
tionment problem ((p1, . . . , pm), k), the method returns a solution (a1, . . . , am) satisfying
ai ≥ ⌊kpi⌋ for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. An apportionment method satisfies quota if it satisfies
both lower and upper quota.
Note that upper quota implies weak proportionality since any deviation from the pro-
portional solution (kp1, . . . , kpm) would violate upper quota for some voter. The same
holds for lower quota.
Frege’s apportionment method satisfies upper quota (and thus weak proportionality)
but fails lower quota. This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3 and Example 5,
21
respectively. Note that Theorem 4 also holds in the apportionment setting and thus
Frege’s apportionment method satisfies quota for m ∈ {2, 3}, and for m ≥ 4 violates
lower quota by at most ⌈m−32 ⌉.
Let us now turn to two monotonicity axioms, viz., house and population monotonicity.
Definition 5. An apportionment method satisfies house monotonicity if the following
holds: for any vote distribution p and positive integer k, if this method returns the solution
(a1, . . . , am) for the problem (p, k) and the solution (b1, . . . , bm) for the problem (p, k+1),
then there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that (i) ai + 1 = bi and (ii) aj = bj for all j 6= i.
In other words, if the house size increases by one, then the apportionment solution can
change only by an increase of 1 for one party. The largest remainder method is notable
in that it actually violates this basic criterium. As Frege’s apportionment method is
calculated iteratively, it is easy to see that it satisfies house monotonicity.
Definition 6. An apportionment method satisfies population monotonicity if the follow-
ing holds: for vote distributions p, p′ and a positive integer k, if this method returns the
solution (a1, . . . , am) for the problem (p, k) and the solution (b1, . . . , bm) for the problem
(p′, k), then for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}:
p′i
p′j
≥
pi
pj
implies that either a′i ≥ ai or a
′
j ≤ aj.
In other words, if party i increases its vote count relative to party j, then either i does
not lose seats or j does not gain seats. We speak of a population paradox if this property
is violated: a gain for party i relative to party j grants extra seats for j while i loses
seats. The following example shows that Frege’s apportionment method suffers from the
population paradox and thus violates population monotonicity.
Example 7. Consider the following two scenarios with three parties (a, b, and c) and
three seats (k = 3): In the first, we have p = ( 820 ,
3
20 ,
9
20), for which Frege’s apportionment
method yields:
time a b c representative
1 820
3
20
9
20
c
2 16
20
6
20 −
2
20 a
3 420
9
20
7
20 b
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In the second scenario, we have p′ = ( 520 ,
4
20 ,
11
20 ).
time a b c representative
1 520
4
20
11
20
c
2 10
20
8
20
2
20 a
3 − 520
12
20
13
20
c
Now consider parties b and c. We have
pb
pc
=
1
3
<
4
11
=
p′b
p′c
,
that is, the relative strength of b over c increases, but b loses a seat while c gains one.
To summarize:
Theorem 5. Frege’s apportionment method satisfies house monotonicity, upper quota,
and quota for m ∈ {2, 3}, but fails lower quota for m ≥ 4 and population monotonicity.
This theorem provides a negative answer to whether Frege’s apportionment method
corresponds to one of the major apportionment methods. It is not a divisor method, as
divisor methods satisfy—and can even be uniquely characterized by—population mono-
tonicity (Balinski and Young, 1982). Furthermore, it is different from the largest remain-
der method (as the largest remainder method fails house monotonicity) and different from
the quota method (as the quota method satisfies lower quota).
Example 8. A concrete example where all apportionment methods listed in Table 3 yield
different solutions is given by p = (79, 7, 6, 3, 2, 1) and a house size k = 20. We omit the
calculations and only list the results:
Largest Remainder: (16, 2, 1, 1, 0, 0) D’Hondt: (18, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
Adams: (14, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1) Sainte-Laguë: (17, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
Huntington-Hill: (15, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) Quota method: (17, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0)
Frege: (16, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0)
5.3. Bias
As a final aspect of apportionment methods, we consider “bias”: Does a method favor
small over large parties—or vice versa? Bias is generally more of a concern when using
apportionment methods for assigning representatives to states and less so for parties. In
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parliamentary elections, a bias for larger parties can support the formation of govern-
ments and disincentivize schisms of parties (Rae, 1967; Balinski and Young, 1982). In
contrast, when assigning representatives to states, a fair treatment of large and small
states is often an essential property (e.g., in the U.S. House of Representatives). How-
ever, an example of strong bias (in the aforementioned sense) is the European parliament,
where small countries have disproportionally many members; this is referred to as de-
gressive proportionality (Koriyama et al., 2013).
To formalize “bias” as an axiom is difficult, as it is best described as a tendency.
Balinski and Young (1982) formalize what it means for a divisor method to be unbiased,
but this definition does not extend to arbitrary apportionment methods. Pukelsheim
(2017) provides a more general, probabilistic analysis assuming that vote distributions
are distributed uniformly at random and that the house size converges to infinity. A third
approach is to compute bias in given data sets. This has been done by Balinski and Young
(1982) and Birkhoff (1976) based on Congressional apportionment in the USA. It is
noteworthy that all these analyses yield similar results.
Our approach is to determine bias via numerical simulations.6 We employ the following
simple test: we assume five parties, each having a vote count between 1 and 1000,
drawn uniformly at random. Furthermore, we assume a house size of 100 seats. For
each apportionment method, we compute the number of votes per representative of the
smallest and the largest party. If pl and ps are the vote counts for the largest and
smallest party, respectively, and al and as are the number of seats of the largest and
smallest party, we say that the given apportionment method favors the smaller party if
ps
as
<
pl
al
,
that is, if the smaller party requires fewer votes per seat. We computed the fraction of
apportionment problems where the smaller party had this advantage based on 1.000.000
instances. A value of 50% would correspond to being perfectly unbiased, as small and
large parties are favored equally often.
The results are shown in Table 4 (including 95% confidence intervals), and can be sum-
marized as follows. Adams favors small parties; D’Hondt and the quota method favor
large parties. Sainte-Laguë and the Largest remainder method are well-balanced, as is
Huntington-Hill, but to a lesser degree. All these findings are in alignment with previous
work (Balinski and Young, 1982; Birkhoff, 1976; Pukelsheim, 2017). Frege’s apportion-
ment method achieves a ratio of 54.5%, in between Sainte-Laguë and Huntington-Hill,
6The Python source code to run these simulations is available (Harrenstein et al., 2020).
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bias 95% confidence interval
Largest Remainder 48.5% (48.41%, 48.61%)
D’Hondt (Jefferson) 11.9% (11.81%, 11.94%)
Adams 87.6% (87.51%, 87.64%)
Sainte-Laguë (Webster) 48.5% (48.38%, 48.58%)
Huntington-Hill 55.7% (55.59%, 55.78%)
Quota method 12.7% (12.60%, 12.73%)
Frege’s apportionment method 54.5% (54.38%, 54.58%)
Table 4: Bias of apportionment methods computed based on numerical simulations. Bias,
as shown here, is the percentage of instances where the smallest party is favored
over the largest party; a value of 50% corresponds to “no bias” for the used set
of apportionment problems.
and thus can be seen as a rather unbiased apportionment method.
To sum up our findings, Frege’s apportionment satisfies strong proportionality guaran-
tees, which are not achievable in the class of divisor methods. The quota method satisfies
slightly stronger proportionality guarantees (both upper and lower quota), but is biased
towards large parties. Frege’s method, in contrast, shows no particular bias towards large
or small parties.
6. Conclusions and Discussion
In our mathematical study of Frege’s voting method we focused on the extent to which
it guarantees various forms of proportionality. Accordingly, we ignored a number of its
other features that are still worth discussing.
Practical applicability in political elections
It should be noted that the proportionality guarantees of Frege’s method only apply
to single constituencies (when observed over time) but not to the political assemblies
formed by the chosen representatives. It is thus possible that the political assembly does
not at all reflect the entire electorate’s current political opinion. This issue becomes
even more dramatic if one considers the actual political decision power within such an
assembly (cf. the work on power indices, e.g., Rae, 1969; Dubey and Shapley, 1979;
Felsenthal and Machover, 1998; Napel, 2019). In particular, it may be beneficial for a
group of candidates (e.g., a party) to receive few additional votes at time t, so that
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all of them are elected at time t + 1 and thus potentially achieve a majority in the
assembly. This paradoxical behaviour leads us to the conclusion that Frege’s method
and the modified Frege method are only sensible for single decisions and not so much in
the broader sense for electing assemblies.
In addition, Frege’s idea is only attractive if the main concern is fairness towards
candidates (in the sense that no votes are lost) and only in the absence of harmful
extremist opinions (as also extremist candidates would win eventually). This is likely
to be the case in low-stake, high-frequency settings, where the long-term behaviour of a
mechanism is much more important than individual decisions. In such settings, moreover,
the strong assumption, occasionally made in this paper, that the electorate is fixed and
does not change their preferences, would arguably also be more reasonable. Frege’s
apportionment method, as introduced in Section 5, is not affected by these considerations
and can be recommended in situations where its axiomatic properties appear desirable.
Gerrymandering
Frege claimed in his proposal (Erläuterungen, 302, [9]) that his method provides a safe-
guard against gerrymandering (“Wahlkreisgeometrie”), that is, the strategic districting
by a political party for electoral gain, an iniquity that infamously pervades representa-
tive systems based on first-past-the-post methods for electing representatives (see, e.g.,
Ricca et al. 2013). The validity of Frege’s claim, however, much depends on the exact
assumptions that are being made and accordingly warrants a careful analysis.
The effectiveness of gerrymandering obviously rests upon the possibility of affecting
the proportional support of a party in constituencies. However, if the constituencies are
of equal size and the combined electorate of all constituencies is fixed, redistricting will
not affect the sum of these proportions, no matter how clever the gerrymander. Thus, if
redistricting can only be performed once, Theorem 1 shows that, as time goes to infinity,
the number of times each candidate for a party is elected in her respective constituency
will be in accordance with this proportion. It would thus follow that Frege’s method does
indeed contravene the designs of gerrymanderers. The argument can be generalized to
electorates that are not necessarily fixed but still comply with the convergence conditions
as in the second part of Theorem 1.
A number of caveats, however, are in place regarding the sweep of this argument. First,
Frege’s voting method is based on the plurality rule, and as such it is still susceptible
to gerrymandering for gain in the short run if an individual election in a constituency
is seen as a singular event (ignoring past and future elections) or as particularly impor-
tant. Second, even when considering the temporal nature of Frege’s method, incidental
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gerrymandering may be successful in achieving short-term benefits without harming the
candidates’ long-term chances. This point also relates to the question of power distri-
bution within an assembly, as discussed above. Third, Frege argues that constituencies
should be kept of a similar size and largely remain unchanged over time (Vorbemerkung,
197, [1]). This demand by itself excludes some forms of gerrymandering but cannot be
seen as a (mathematical) guarantee of his voting method. Therefore, Frege’s method
certainly prevents or hinders certain forms of gerrymandering, but to which extent and
under which assumptions is a question we leave for future research. Furthermore, it
would be interesting to investigate whether the modified Frege method guarantees a
better protection against gerrymandering.
Choice candidates and delegation
Among all candidates in a constituency, Frege proposes to distinguish so-called choice
candidates (“Erlesene”), the twenty-five candidates in a constituency with maximal elec-
toral backing, among which the representative will be chosen. So as to ensure that no
votes are lost, Frege also provisioned for a delegation mechanism, in which non-choice
candidates or deceased choice candidates can transfer the votes cast on them to one of
the (living) choice candidates. What exactly the social choice theoretic ramifications of
this delegation mechanism are is left as a topic for future research. Furthermore, this
mechanism could be compared with modern proposals for vote delegation (Alger, 2006;
Green-Armytage, 2015; Blum and Zuber, 2016).
Negative aggregate scores and strategic voting
We have seen how an increasing cost of winning undermines the proportionality guaran-
tees of Frege’s method until this cost stabilizes (after a potentially very long time). A
further disadvantage of the original method is that long-serving candidates tend to have
high scores, which makes the entry of new candidates difficult, even if they have a strong
public support. In contrast, the modified Frege method has a constant cost of winning
and, as we have seen, stronger proportionality guarantees. However, here the aggregate
scores of the candidates can be negative, which also leads to negative consequences. The
possibility of negative scores renders the modified Frege method vulnerable to the follow-
ing type of manipulation. Once a candidate has a negative score, it is advantageous for
this candidate to retract his or her candidacy in favor of a like-minded person (in social
choice terminology a so-called clone), who then starts with an aggregate score of 0 and
by that increases their score. A complete study of the manipulability of Frege’s voting
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method and the modified Frege method is subject to future research.
Transition from plurality to proportionality
The plurality rule performs very badly when it comes to proportionality in the long run.
If the electorate is assumed to be fixed, it will always elect the same candidate! Frege’s
method has much better proportionality properties, and the modified Frege method even
better ones still. In an important and interesting sense, Frege’s method can be seen as
a gradual transition between a system based on plurality towards a system based on the
modified Frege method, as the cost of winning is increased until it stabilizes at the size
of the electorate and henceforward behaves like the modified Frege method.
Outlook and research directions
The temporal or dynamic aspect of the Frege methods distinguishes them from most
other voting methods that have been considered in the literature. As such they can
also take into account changing electorates and changing opinions among the electorate.
Yet, the dynamic Frege methods still rely on the plurality rule in that plurality ballots
are used and, for any election at any one single time, they simply select the candidate
with the highest aggregate score. Seen this way, the Frege methods could easily be
varied upon by considering other ‘static’ social choice rules instead of the plurality rule,
thus defining a new class of dynamic voting rules that can be studied from a social
choice perspective in their own right. An obvious variation, for instance, would be to
assume that the voters’ ballots specify complete preference orders over the candidates.
This would allow the computation of Borda scores. The candidates then aggregate their
respective Borda scores over time in a similar way as they aggregate plurality scores for
the Frege methods. At each election the candidate with the highest Borda score could
then be chosen as representative and subsequently incur a certain cost of winning yet
to be defined. In order to investigate this class of dynamic voting rules in a systematic
and principled fashion, one may want to define axioms that are specific to the temporal
setting, like variable quota axioms. In particular it would be interesting to see if there is
a dynamic voting rule that satisfies both variable upper and lower quota.
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A. Proofs of Section 3
Lemma 1. Assume that the number of voters is fixed, i.e., nt = n for all t ≥ 1. Then the
function a(t) =
∑
k∈C σ
t
k is monotonically increasing. Moreover, there exists a positive
number t0 such that a(t) = n ·m for all t ≥ t0.
Proof. Let us establish a recursive definition for a(t), starting with
a(1) =
∑
k∈C
σ1k =
∑
k∈C
π1k = n.
Let j∗ = repr (t). Then the following equalities hold:
a(t+ 1) =
∑
k∈C
σt+1k = σ
t
j∗ + π
t+1
j∗ −
⌊
1
m
∑
k∈C
σtk
⌋
+
∑
k 6=j∗
(σtk + π
t+1
k )
=
∑
k
σtk +
∑
k
πt+1k −
⌊
1
m
∑
k∈C
σtk
⌋
= a(t) + n−
⌊
1
m
a(t)
⌋
for t ≥ 1.
Now, let us start by proving that there exists a t0 ∈ N such that a(t) ≥ n ·m for all
t ≥ t0. For this purpose, let us consider the simpler recursion b(1) = n and b(t + 1) =
b(t) + n − 1
m
· b(t). This recursion has the solution b(t) = nm
(
1−
(
m−1
m
)t)
. Note that
b(t) converges to nm for t → ∞. Furthermore, it holds that b(t) ≤ a(t) (this can easily
be shown by induction). Since b(t) converges to nm and a(t) is integer-valued, there has
to be a point in time t1 such that a(t) ≥ nm for all t ≥ t1.
Let t0 ≥ 1 be the smallest possible choice for t1, i.e., t0 is chosen such that a(t0) ≥ nm
and a(t0 − 1) < nm. We want to show that a(t0) = nm. Let i ∈ N be such that
a(t0 − 1) = nm− i. Then, using the recursion for a(t), we obtain the following:
a(t0) = a(t0 − 1) + n−
⌊
a(t0 − 1)
m
⌋
= nm− i+ n−
⌊
nm− i
m
⌋
= nm− i+ n− n−
⌊
−
i
m
⌋
= nm− i+
⌈
i
m
⌉
≤ nm,
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since −i+
⌈
i
m
⌉
≤ 0. It follows that a(t0) = nm.
Now, let us prove that a(t) = nm for all t ≥ t0. Using the recursion for a(t), we have
a(t0 + 1) = nm+ n−
⌊
nm
m
⌋
= nm. By induction a(t) = nm for all t ≥ t0.
Let us finally show that the function a(t) is monotonically increasing. From what was
proven so far, we now that 0 ≤ a(t) ≤ nm and thus 0 ≤
⌊
a(t)
m
⌋
≤ n for all t ≥ 1. Thus,
we have for all t ≥ 1:
a(t+ 1) = a(t) + n−
⌊
1
m
a(t)
⌋
≥ a(t) + n− n = a(t).
Theorem 1. If we assume a fixed electorate, i.e., nt = n and π
t
j = πj for all t ≥ 1, the
following holds for Frege’s voting method:
lim
t→∞
ρj(t)
t
=
πj
n
.
If nt = n and for all t ≥ 1 and for all j ∈ C there is some π
∗
j ∈ [0, 1] such that
lim
t→∞
∑t
s=1 π
s
j
t
= π∗j ,
then the following holds for all candidates j ∈ C:
lim
t→∞
ρj(t)
t
=
π∗j
n
.
Let us first prove a technical lemma, which is required in the proof of Theorem 1:
Lemma A.1. Assume that the number of voters n is fixed. For every candidate j ∈ C
there exists a positive integer cj such that for all t ≥ t0
σt+1j =
t+1∑
s=1
πsj − cj − n · (ρj(t)− ρj(t0)) , (1)
where t0 ≥ 1 is such that
∑
k∈C σ
t0
k = nm.
Proof. Let t0 ≥ 1 be such that
∑
k∈C σ
t0
k = nm (the existence of such a t0 was proven in
Lemma 1), and let cj ≥ 0 be such that
σt0+1j =
t0+1∑
s=1
πsj − cj .
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We shall prove equation (1) by induction over t ≥ t0.
For the induction start, let us consider time t0:
σt0+1j =
t0+1∑
s=1
πsj − cj =
t0+1∑
s=1
πsj − cj − n · (ρj(t0)− ρj(t0)) .
For the induction step, we distinguish whether repr (t+1) = j or not. We may assume
that σt+1j =
∑t+1
s=1 π
s
j − cj − (ρj(t)− ρj(t0)) · n. In case repr (t+ 1) = j, we have:
σt+2j = σ
t+1
j + π
t+2
j −
⌊
1
m
∑
k∈C
σt+1k
⌋
=
t+1∑
s=1
πsj − cj − (ρj(t)− ρj(t0)) · n+ π
t+2
j − n
=
t+2∑
s=1
πsj − cj − (ρj(t) + 1− ρj(t0)) · n
=
t+2∑
s=1
πsj − cj − (ρj(t+ 1)− ρj(t0)) · n.
In case repr (t+ 1) 6= j, we have:
σt+2j = σ
t+1
j + π
t+2
j
=
t+1∑
s=1
πsj − cj − (ρj(t)− ρj(t0)) · n+ π
t+2
j
=
t+2∑
s=1
πsj − cj − (ρj(t)− ρj(t0)) · n
=
t+2∑
s=1
πsj − cj − (ρj(t+ 1)− ρj(t0)) · n,
which concludes the induction step.
Proof of Theorem 1. Assuming a fixed electorate, equation (1) becomes:
σt+1j = (t+ 1) · πj − cj − (ρj(t)− ρj(t0)) · n (2)
or, equivalently,
ρj(t)
t
=
πj
n
+
1
t
(
πj
n
+ ρj(t0)−
cj
n
−
σt+1j
n
)
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To see that the expression 1
t
(. . . ) converges to 0, note the following: First, 0 ≤
pij
n
≤ 1
and 0 ≤ ρj(t0) ≤ t0. Moreover, 0 ≤ cj ≤ ρj(t0) · n ≤ t0 · n and 0 ≤ σ
t+1
j ≤ n ·m. Thus,
the term in brackets is bounded from below and above. We obtain:
lim
t→∞
ρj(t)
t
=
πj
n
.
Similarly, if the electorate is not fixed but the mean plurality scores converge, i.e.,
limt→∞ 1/t ·
∑t
s=1 π
s
j = π
∗
j for all j ∈ C, we have:
ρj(t)
t
=
∑t
s=1 π
s
j
t · n
+
1
t
(
πt+1j
n
+ ρj(t0)−
cj
n
−
σt+1j
n
)
and thus
lim
t→∞
ρj(t)
t
= lim
t→∞
∑t
s=1 π
s
j
t · n
=
π∗j
n
.
The following proposition shows that, for a fixed electorate, proportionality is not only
guaranteed in the limit but eventually also within (finite) intervals.
Proposition 1. If we assume a fixed electorate with n voters, there exists a time t∗ ≥ 1
and a period length P ∈ N such that, for all t ≥ t∗ and all j ∈ C,
ρj(t+ P )− ρj(t)
P
=
πj
n
.
Proof. From Lemma 1 we know that 0 ≤ σtk ≤ nm for all k ∈ C and t ≥ 1. Thus the
tuple (σt1, σ
t
2, . . . , σ
t
m) can only take finitely many values. Therefore there must be a time
t∗ ≥ 1 and an integer P such that
(σt
∗
1 , σ
t∗
2 , . . . , σ
t∗
m) = (σ
t∗+P
1 , σ
t∗+P
2 , . . . , σ
t∗+P
m ).
Given these two values t∗ and P , it clearly also holds that
(σt
∗+k
1 , σ
t∗+k
2 , . . . , σ
t∗+k
m ) = (σ
t∗+P+k
1 , σ
t∗+P+k
2 , . . . , σ
t∗+P+k
m ) for k ∈ N and thus
(σt1, σ
t
2, . . . , σ
t
m) = (σ
t+P
1 , σ
t+P
2 , . . . , σ
t+P
m ) for all t ≥ t
∗.
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From equation (1) in Lemma A.1 it follows that the following holds for t ≥ t∗ − 1:
ρj(t+ P )− ρj(t0) =
1
n
·
(
πj · (t+ P + 1)− cj − σ
t+P+1
j
)
and ρj(t)− ρj(t0) =
1
n
·
(
πj · (t+ 1)− cj − σ
t+1
j
)
.
Thus
ρj(t+ P )− ρj(t) =
1
n
·
(
πj · P − (σ
t+P+1
j − σ
t+1
j )
)
=
πj · P
n
,
which concludes the proof.
B. Proofs of Section 4
Theorem 2. If we assume that ptj = pj for all t ≥ 1, the following holds for the modified
Frege method:
lim
t→∞
rj(t)
t
= pj.
If the normalized plurality scores ptj are not fixed but for all j ∈ C there is some p
∗
j ∈ [0, 1]
such that
lim
t→∞
∑t
s=1 p
s
j
t
= p∗j ,
then the following holds for all candidates j ∈ C:
lim
t→∞
rj(t)
t
= lim
t→∞
∑t
s=1 p
s
j
t
= p∗j .
Let us first prove a technical lemma, which will yield the desired proportionality results.
Lemma B.1. For the modified Frege method, we have
∑
j∈C s
t
j = 1 and −1 < s
t
j − p
t
j
for all j ∈ C and t ≥ 1.
Proof. The proof of the first statement is by induction on t. For the basis t = 1, we
immediately have ∑
j∈C
s1j =
∑
j∈C
p1j =
∑
j∈C
π1j
n1
= 1.
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For the induction step, we assume
∑
j∈C s
t
j = 1. Let j
∗ = repr (t). Then,
∑
j∈C
st+1j =
∑
k 6=j∗
(
stk + p
t+1
k
)
+ stj∗ + p
t+1
j∗ − 1
=
∑
j∈C
stj +
∑
j∈C
pt+1j − 1 = 1 + 1− 1 = 1.
The proof of the second statement is by induction on t as well. For the basis t = 1, we
immediately have
s1j − p
1
j = p
1
j − p
1
j = 0 > −1.
For the induction step, we assume −1 < stj − p
t
j . We distinguish two cases. First, if
j 6= repr (t), we have:
st+1j − p
t+1
j = s
t
j + p
t+1
j − p
t+1
j = s
t
j ≥ s
t
j − p
t
j > −1.
Second, if j = repr (t), it has to hold that stj ≥
∑
j∈C s
t
j
m
= 1
m
(in order for j to win). Thus
we have:
st+1j − p
t+1
j = s
t
j + p
t+1
j − 1− p
t+1
j = s
t
j − 1 ≥
1
m
− 1 > −1.
Proof of Theorem 2. Note that the following holds for the modified Frege method:
st+1j =
t+1∑
s=1
psj − rj(t) for all t ≥ 1 and j ∈ C. (3)
This corresponds to a normalized version of equation (1) in the proof of Lemma A.1 with
rj(t0) = 0 and cj = 0.
It follows that
rj(t)
t
=
∑t+1
s=1 p
s
j
t
−
st+1j
t
.
Since we know from Lemma B.1 that −1 ≤ st+1j ≤ 1, both asymptotic results follow
immediately.
We proceed with another technical lemma, which is useful for proving Theorems 3
and 4.
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Lemma B.2. For every t ≥ 1 and j ∈ C:
−1 <
t∑
s=1
psj − rj(t) ≤
m− 1
2
.
The second inequality is strict for m ≥ 3.
Proof. The lower bound of −1 follows from a combination of Lemma B.1 and Theorem 2:
By virtue of equation (3) in the proof of Theorem 2, the lower bound is equivalent to
−1 < st+1j − p
t+1
j . Lemma B.1 ensures that this inequality holds for all j ∈ C and all
t ≥ 1.
To prove the upper bound of m−12 , by virtue of equation (3), it suffices to show by
induction on t that st+1j − p
t+1
j ≤
m−1
2 for all candidates j and t ≥ 1. For the basis, let
t = 1. First assume that j = repr (1). Then, observing that 0 < p1j ≤ 1,
s2j − p
2
j = s
1
j + p
2
j − 1− p
2
j = p
1
j − 1 ≤ 0 <
m−1
2 ,
where the last inequality is strict as we always assume m ≥ 2. Now assume that
j 6= repr (1). Then, p1j ≤
1
2 , as otherwise j would have been chosen as representative.
Accordingly,
s2j − p
2
j = s
1
j + p
2
j − p
2
j = p
1
j ≤
1
2 ≤
m−1
2 ,
where the last inequality is strict if m ≥ 3.
For the induction step, we may assume st+1j − p
t+1
j ≤
m−1
2 to prove that s
t+2
j − p
t+2
j ≤
m−1
2 (for m ≥ 3 we assume strict inequalities). First assume that j = repr (t+ 1). Now
the following inequalities hold.
st+2j − p
t+2
j = s
t+1
j + p
t+2
j − 1− p
t+2
j = s
t+1
j − 1 ≤ s
t+1
j − p
t+1
j ≤i.h.
m−1
2 .
Now, let j∗ = repr (t + 1) and assume that j 6= j∗. Accordingly, st+1j ≤ s
t+1
j∗ . By virtue
of Lemma B.1, we have that
st+1j + s
t+1
j∗ +
∑
k∈C\{j,j∗}
st+1k = 1.
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As we saw above that −1 < st+1j − p
t+1
j , we also have the following:
st+1j + s
t+1
j∗ = 1−
∑
k∈C\{j,j∗} s
t+1
k
≤ 1−
∑
k∈C\{j,j∗}(s
t+1
k − p
t+1
k )
< 1 +m− 2
= m− 1.
As st+1j ≤ s
t+1
j∗ , it follows that s
t+1
j <
m−1
2 . Finally, since rj(t+ 1) = rj(t),
st+2j − p
t+2
j =
t+2∑
s=1
psj − rj(t+ 1)− p
t+2
j =
t+1∑
s=1
psj − rj(t) = s
t+1
j <
m− 1
2
,
which concludes the induction.
Theorem 3. The modified Frege method satisfies variable upper quota.
Proof. By Lemma B.2, it holds that
t∑
s=1
psj − rj(t) > −1,
and consequently
rj(t) <
t∑
s=1
psj + 1.
This is equivalent to
rj(t) ≤
⌈
t∑
s=1
psj
⌉
,
which is exactly the condition for variable upper quota.
Theorem 4. For m ∈ {2, 3}, the modified Frege method satisfies variable lower quota.
For m ≥ 4, we have rj(t) ≥
⌊∑t
s=1 p
s
j
⌋
−
⌈
m−3
2
⌉
for every candidate j and time t ≥ 1.
Proof. By Lemma B.2, it holds that
t∑
s=1
psj − rj(t) <
m− 1
2
for m ≥ 3,
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and consequently
rj(t) >
t∑
s=1
psj −
m− 1
2
.
This implies
rj(t) ≥
⌊
t∑
s=1
psj
⌋
−
⌈
m− 3
2
⌉
.
For m = 3, the last inequality becomes
rj(t) ≥
⌊
t∑
s=1
psj
⌋
and thus lower quota is fulfilled.
For m = 2, variable lower quota follows from variable upper quota. Let C = {a, b}
and
∑t
s=1 p
s
j = xj for j ∈ {a, b}. Thus, xa + xb = t. Towards a contradiction, assume
without loss of generality that ra(t) < ⌊xa⌋, i.e., candidate a’s lower quota is violated.
Then:
rb(t) = t− ra(t) > t− ⌊xa⌋ > t− ⌊t− xb⌋ = ⌈xb⌉,
which is in contradiction to variable upper quota for candidate b.
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